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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, Kay Chapman, was invited to a surprise birthday party for one of her old

boyfriends at the home of the defendants, VonDel and Becky Chapman, husband and wife. (Tr.,
p. 168, L1. 5-25). While at defendants' home, plaintiff fell while using the bathroom and injured
her shoulder. PIaintiff had been to the defendants' home once before, but it was not certain
whether she had visited the bathroom on that occasion. (Tr. p. 166, L1. 3-25, p. 167, L1. 1-25, p.
168, L1. 1-4).
The surprise birthday party was organized by Shawna Williams, a mutual friend of the
both the plaintiff and defendant, Becky Chapman. Shawna is the one who sent out the invitations
and made the arrangements. (Tr. P. 256, L1.6-12). The plaintiff brought alcohol with her to the
party. There was some dispute at trial as to whether she had alcohol to drink before she arrived,
but the plaintiff's story was that she only had a Iittle to drink after arriving at defendants' home
and she was not under the influence of alcohol when she went into defendants' bathroom. (Tr. p.
121, LI. 12-25, p.122, Ll. 1-7, p.170, L1. 12-25, p.171, U. 1-19, p. 174, L1. 8-25, p. 175, L1. 1-9).
There was testimony from and independent witness, Audra Burgener, that within 15 or 20
minutes of plaintiffs arrival at the party, and before plaintiff went into the bathroom, plaintiff
was talking in a loud voice, and using inappropriate language. (Tr. p. 323, L1. 10-25, p. 324, LI.
1-2, 15-25, p. 235, L1.9-14). However, neither of the defendants were aware of how much
plaintiff drank because defendant, Becky Chapman, as the hostess, was busy preparing food and
working in the kitchen, and the defendant, Vondel Chapman, spent much of the time in his
garage retreat watching television. (Tr. p. 262, L1. 2-16, p. 286, Lf. 10-25, p. 287, Ll. 1-11).

Defendant, Becky Chapman, bought a new bathroom rug for the party and placed it in the
bathroom. It was a typical rug like many other mgs that she had used in her bathroom over the
years. (Tr. p. 240, L1.7-10, p. 200, Ll. 1-8, p. 215, L1. 17-25, p. 216, L1. 1-5).
When the plaintiff walked into the bathroom she could see the toilet, the step down
shower, the tile floor and the rug. She claims that her heal caught either in her pant leg or slipped
on the rug,and she fell into the sunken tublshower area. She asserted that she would have been
more careful had the defendants told her that other people had fallen in that bathroom. (Tr. p.
126, LI. 15-21, p. 176, Ll. 9-25, p. 177,Ll. 1-18, p. 178, p. 179, p. 180, p. 181,Ll. 1-18, p. 186,
L1. 12-25, p. 188, p. 189, Ll. 18-21,p.191, L1. 15-25, p. 192, L1. 1-12).
After it was discovered that the plaintiff was hurt, defendant, Becky Chapman, drove
plaintiff to the hospital in Idaho Falls in the plaintiffs car. The hospital emergency room record
said that the plaintiff was intoxicated. (Exhibit I, Tr. P. 172, L1.21-25, p. 173, p. 174, Ll. 1-10).
The plaintiff injured her shoulder when she fell and had substantial medical expense as a result of
her fall in defendants' bathroom.
Defendant, Becky Chapman, had grown up in the subject home, it having been built by
her parents in approximately 1963, when she was in the fifth grade. Even when her parents were
quite old they used the toilet and shower in the subject bathroom. (Tr. p. 239, L1. 19-25, p. 240,
L1. 1-10). After her parents passed away and Becky was married, she and her husband moved
into her parents home and have been there every since. (Tr. p. 197, L1. 8-17). The bathroom in
question has not been changed since the home was built by Becky's parents. It was built for the

convenience of her parents so that they could have a step down tublshower, all in one. (Tr. p.
234, L1. 3-25, p. 235, Ll. 1-10).
Over the years the defendants had enjoyed entertaining and had many social events and
many people of various ages at their home and to their knowledge no one had ever been injured
in their bathroom, except for the plaintiff. (Tr. p. 256, Ll. 2-5, p. 249, L1. 13-25, p. 250, Ll.1-25,

p. 251, L1. 1-25, p. 252, L1. 1-25, p. 253, L1. 1-25, p. 254, Ll. 1-25, p. 255, L1. 1-18). However,
about twenty (20) years ago one of defendants' social guests came out of the bathroom laughing
and announced that he had fallen in the bathroom. He said nothing about why he fell and there
was no injury. (Tr. p. 210, L1. 6-25, p. 216, L1. 14-25, p. 217, L1. 1-16).
There was no dispute at trial over the plaintiff's storey that she fell into the step down
shower. Also, all her medical bills and records were admitted by stipulation. (R. pgs. 34-35).
The only dispute at trial was whether or not the defendants were legally responsible for plaintiff's
fall and resulting injury.

11.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR EN EXCLUDING SOME OF THE TESTIMONY
OFFERED THROUGH MATTHEW MEACHAM.
The standard for reviewing a trial court's rulings regarding admissibility of expert

testimony is the same as that used in reviewing challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings,
the abuse of discretion standard. In Perry v. Magic Valley Reg. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,51,
995 I?. 2d 816, 821 (2000), this court defined its role as follows:
This Court reviews challenges to a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse
of discretion standard. (Citation omitted). These include trial court decisions
admitting or excluding expert witness testimony, (Citation omitted); and
excluding evidence on the basis that it is more prejudicial than probative, (citation
omitted). Error is disregarded unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial

court's discretion and affects a substantial right of the party. (Citations omitted).
To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this court considers
whether it correctly
. *perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within
the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards,
and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. (Citation omitted).

In the case at bar, the trial court issued a memorandum decision before trial on this very issue.
(R. p. 20-27). It is impossible to read the trial court's memorandum decision and not readily see
that the court understood that it was a matter of discretion it was considering, that it must act
within the bounds of discretion consistent with legal standards and reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. (R. p. 23). The trial court met that standard when it wrote its memorandum
decision and again during trial when this issue was revisited. (R. p. 20-27). The trial court even
took a recess to consider the issue before ruling on the question. (Tr. p. 74, L1. 16-21; p. 76, L1.
14-25; p. 77, L1. 1-25; p. 78, L1. 1-7).
It is not even arguable that the slight limitation the court placed on the testimony of
plaintiff's expert, was a "manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion." Further, that limitation
did not affect a substantial right of the plaintiff. The trial courI granted the plaintiff wide
discretion in presenting evidence in support of her case.
During discovery, the defendants had allowed plaintiff and her expert, Matthew
Meacham, to visit their home and examine the bathroom. The defendant even supplied the very
rug that was in place in the bathroom at the time the plaintiff fell so that it was there when Mr.
Meacham visited. Mr. Meacham was allowed to take photographs and all of those photographs
were allowed into evidence by stipulation. (R. p. 35, Exhibit Q). The photogaphs taken by Mr.
Meacham showed what a person would observe entering the bathroom looking toward the toilet

and looking at the shower in front of the toilet. There was no evidence introduced at trial that the
design of the bathroom violated any code, but the plaintiff's expert testified extensively about his
obsewations of the bathroom, about the photographs he took, about how tile floors and rugs can
be slick and about how if you were to fall into the sunken tile tublshower and hit your shoulder it
could cause physical injury, just like the injury plaintiff suffered.
Specifically, Mr. Meacham testified there were twenty-four (24) inches from the lip or
edge of the toilet to the edge of the first step into the shower area, (Tr. p. 44.11. 1-3) that from a
safety standpoint he would have wanted edge protection between the toilet and the tublshower,
(Tr. p. 45, I1 16-25, p. 46,11 1-12) that the rug did not have a good backing on it which could
allow it to bunch up thus causing a potential risk or likelihood of a slip, trip or a fall, (Tr. p. 49,
11. 1-25 ) that the rug in question contributed to plaintiff's fall, (Tr. p. 49,iI. 1-25; p. 50,11 1-18;
p. 51,Il. 5-10) and that the sudden "drop off', as he described the steps down into the shower,
was a significant contributing factor to the cause of plaintiff's fall. He further testified that all
those matters were contributing factors to the accident, (Tr. p. 53,ll. 2-19) that plaintiff's injuries
were consistent with the fall plaintiff had, (Tr. P. 57,ll. 23-25; p. 58,ll. 1-7) and that her
injuries were worse because of the configuration of the bathroom. (Tr. P. 60,ll. 12-24).
However, there was no testimony from Mr. Meacham that he had special expertise about
alcohol and the effect, if any, the consumption of alcohol may have on a person and how that
person might react to a tile floor, a rug, steps down into a shower, or anything similar. He also
denied experience with women's high heel shoes, like the plaintiff wore. (Tr. p. 95, L1.9-21).

Therefore, what more could have been achieved by Mi. Meacham also opining that he
believed the bathroom posed a "danger" and a "hazard"? While he didn't use those exact words,
he had already said as much. It became clear from the argument of plaintiff's counsel on that
issue that plaintiff wanted those additional words to overcome what counsel perceived to be
some kind of jury bias. However, the tnal court quickly pointed out that there was no evidence
of bias. (Tr. p. 69.11. 3-1 1).
Respondents take issue with a repeated assertion made in plaintiff's brief at pages 12, 13
and 15. She makes the assertion that defendants' counsel was allowed to argue that plaintiff's
expert did not conclude that the bathroom was dangerous or hazardous. None of the arguments
of counsel to the jury have been made a part of the record on appeal. It is therefor, inappropriate
to make an observation or statement of fact regarding argument of counsel, when no record of
that has been provided. However, counsel for defendants remembers arguing to the jury that the
testimony of plaintiffs expert showed how obvious any danger or hazard that existed in the
bathroom was and would have been to the plaintiff herself had she used reasonable care for her
own safety. That is substantially different than plaintiff's assertion, and was consistent with the
evidence.
Frankly, there is a real question whether the testimony of Mr. Meacham was even expert
testimony that should have been allowed at all. Any lay person can take measurements and
photographs as he did; any lay person that is old enough to be on the jury will have had
experiences with tile floors in bathrooms and rugs on tile floors and will also have had
experience with tile steps. In fact, the Bingham County Court House steps were tile. There is

redly nothing that Mr. Meacharn testified to that required any expertise or specialized
knowledge. His measurements didn't require any expertise; his photographs didn't require any
expertise; his observations of the rug required no expertise; his observations of the tile floor
required no expertise and his repeating what the plaintiff told him required no expertise. In
reality he gave the jury nothing that they couldn't have received through a lay witness.
Therefore under IRE 702, the real question was whether Mr. Meacham had any
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, that assisted the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine the fact at issue. Since Mr. Meacham's testimony was not
scientific, technical or specialized, it should not have been admitted al all, let alone his opinions
on the ultimate issue. If anyone was prejudiced by what Mr. Meacham was allowed to say, it was
the defendants because he dressed lay testimony up in an "expert" package to give it more
weight.

111. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING THE PLAINTIFF'S
REQUESTED LNSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 18,20 AND 24.
The standard for review of jury instructions given by a trial court is, as follows:
Whetherjury instructions fairly and adequately present the issue and state the
applicable law is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg. Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46.51; 995 P.2d 816,82I
(2000). When reviewing jury instructions on appeal, this Court asks whether the
instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law.
Leslie, 138 Idaho at 305,62 P. 3d at 1103. I f the Court finds the instructions
adequately present the issues and state the applicable law, this Court will not
reverse the trial court. Leazer v. Kiefer, 120 Idaho 902, 902, 824 P. 2d 957, 959
(1951). However, if this court does find the instructions are not factually or
legally accurate, it will not reverse the trial court unless the instructions would
mislead the jury or prejudice the complaining party. Id.; see also Perry, 134 Idaho
at 51,995 P. 2d at 821.

Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corporation, 139 Idaho 761, 765,86P. 3d
475,479 (Idaho 2004).
The question then is whether or not the trial court gave jury instructions that taken as a whole
fairly and adequately presented the issues and the law of the case.
When one considers the instructions given by the trial court, Instruction 20, defining
negligence, Instruction 21, defining proximate cause and Instructions 22,23,24, 25 and 26, on
duties of land owners, it is clear that the court instructed the jury properly. The jury was
instructed that the defendants, had a duty to exercise ordinary care towards the plaintiff, and that
they had a duty to warn the pIaintiff of any dangerous or defective condition that they knew about
that plaintiff wouldn't have discovered using ordinary care. That is what the case was about and
that is how the jury was instructed.
There was no evidence introduced at trial that the defendants had knowledge that
something "probably would result in harm because of a dangerous condition of the premises" in
fact the opposite was true. The evidence was that over the course of forty (40) years the
bathroom had been used by an active family who had many social guests over those years but no
one had ever been hurt in the bathroom. There was much ado made by the plaintiff about an
event approximately twenty (20) years before when a visitor who had been drinking went into the
bathroom and came out lau&ng saying that he had fallen. However, there was no evidence that
he had faIlen in the shower or that he had fallen in front of the toilet, slipped on a rug, or that he
was injured. There was no evidence of any forewarning to the defendants that there was a danger
that would not be known or observable to anyone entering the bathroom.

The thing that did come out loud and clear through the photographs taken by Mr.
Meacham, was that anyone entering the bathroom would see the toilet, the tile floor, the rug and
the step down shower. There was no evidence that because the rug was new that it created some
new danger that would not have existed for the proceeding forty (40) years with the old rugs.
It would have been totally inappropriate for the trial court to have given plaintiff's
requested instruction 18 as it had nothing to do with the evidenceand it would have misled or at
least confused the jury. Plaintiff's requested instruction 20 is clearly covered by Instruction 23
given by the court. Plaintiff's requested instruction 24 would have been senseless since there
was no evidence of intentional or reckless conduct on behalf of the defendants. The instructions
given by the trial court were completely fair to the plaintiff.

IV.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY PURSUANT TO PLAINTIFF'S PURPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERS 14 AND 15.
The plaintiff argues that there is some magic with her requested instructions 14 and 15

that just didn't happen with the trial court's instruction 21. However, the trial court's instruction

21 directly follows the language of this Court in Garcia v. Winley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P. 3d 819
(Idaho 2007). This Court in Garcia ruled that the defect in IDJI 2.30.2 is the last sentence of the
first paragraph, stating that it would have to be omitted in order for the instruction to be
consistent with the removal of the "but for" language included in IDJI 2.30.1. That is exactly
what the trial court did here. It gave IDJI 2.30.2 leaving out the last sentence of the first
paragraph, the only sentence in that instruction that is inconsistent with the "substantial factor"
test.

As the court stated in Garcia, the only time the "substantial factor" instruction is given
rather than the "but for" instruction is when there is evidence of multiple causes of an injury.
However, in this case there was only one cause of the injury. The defense in this case never
argued that the plaintiff's medical bills, or shoulder injury, were caused by anything other than
her fall in the defendants' bathroom. There was never any argument that plaintiff's shoulder
surgery resulted from a preexisting condition or congenital matters. Therefore, the "but for"
instruction should have been given rather than the "substantial factor" instruction. However, the
fact that the "substantial factor" instruction was given prejudiced only the defendants, and since
they are not appealing, reversal is not appropriate. Id. at I64 P.3d 825.

V.

THE JURY VERDICT WAS CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE
LAW AND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTLAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE
The cases, cited by plaintiff, clearly show that the trial court instructed the jury properly

in this case and the jury made a very reasonable decision based on the facts. The Court of
Appeals in Keller v. Holiday Inn's, Inc., 105 Idaho 649,671 P. 2d 1112 (Ct. App. 1983) had
iuled that when there is an open and obvious danger a plaintiff could not sue the land owner
when the plaintiff was injured by proceeding in light of that open and obvious danger. That case
was overruled by this Court in a limited way in Keller v. Holiday Inn's, Inc., 107 Idaho 593,596,
691 P. 2d 1208 (Idaho 1984). Therein this Court stated:
As noted previously, the trial court held even if a duty did exist on the part of
Holiday Inn, Holiday Inn could not be held liable because plaintiffs had assumed
the risk of injury. However, defenses of this sort generally present a question of
fact which should be left to the jury, unless the facts are undisputed and only one
reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom. (Citations omitted. Therefore, we
reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Decisions that have followed after the Holiday Inn's case have continued to limit the duty owed
to social guests or invitees. That restriction on duty is set out clearly in Holzeheimer v.

J o h m e s e n , 125 Idaho 397,400,871 P. 2d 814,817 (1994), as follows:
A licensee is a visitor who goes upon the premises of another with the consent of
the landowner in pursuit of the visitor's purpose. (Citations omitted). Likewise, a
social guest is also a licensee. (Citations omitted). The duty owed to a licensee is
narrow. A landowner is only required to share with a licensee knowledge of
dangerous conditions or activities on the land. (Citations omitted). Additionally,
this Court has held that "the fact that a guest may be rendering a minor incidental
service to the host does not change the relationship [between them as a landowner
and licensee]. (Citations omitted).

A heightened duty is owed to a business invitee, someone who is there for business purpose. The
Holzeheimer court defined that duty as follows:
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises for a purpose connected with the
business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be said that the visit may
confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible benefit to the land owner.
(Citation omitted). A landowner owes the invitee the duty to keep the premises in a
reasonably safe condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers.

125 Idaho at 400.

In this case, plaintiff never contended that she was a business invitee, but freely admined she was
a social guest or licensee. However, she now seems to argue that the jury should have been
instructed as if she were a business invitee contrary to her admission and the facts.
Plaintiff's contention on appeal is exactly what she contended at trial. Plaintiff contends
that she should have been a warning before she entered the bathroom. (Tr. p.186, Ll. 12-18). The
question though is what could the defendants have warned the plaintiff about that the plaintiff
herself could not have readily seen. Forty years of living in a house without anyone ever slipping
and falling on a rug in front of a toilet and into the shower would hardly seem to be fore

knowledge on behalf of the defendant homeowners that would somehow be superior to the
plaintiff's own experience with bathrooms, toilets, tile floors, rugs, steps, etc. All of those
matters were clearly visible to the plaintiff. (Tr. p. 181, L1. 9-18, p. 191, Ll. 15-25). Thus, for the
jury to find that the defendants were not negligent is not only reasonable, it is the only conclusion
that reasonable minds could have made. The plaintiff is really asserting that a homeowner must
guarantee that no one visiting his or her home will slip, trip, or fall. That is not, and should never
be, the law of Idaho.

VI.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants, VonDel and Becky Chapman, respectfully

request that this Court deny the appellants petition on appeal and allow the jury verdict to stand.
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